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Abstract—Small-scale clouds (SCs) often suffer from resource
under-provisioning during peak demand, leading to inability to
satisfy service level agreements (SLAs) and consequent loss of
customers. One approach to address this problem is for a set of
autonomous SCs to share resources among themselves in a cost-
induced cooperative fashion, thereby increasing their individual
capacities (when needed) without having to significantly invest
in more resources. A central problem (in this context) is how to
properly share resources (for a price) to achieve profitable service
while maintaining customer SLAs. To address this problem, in
this paper, we propose the SC-Share framework that utilizes
two interacting models: (i) a stochastic performance model that
estimates the achieved performance characteristics under given
SLA requirements, and (ii) a market-based game-theoretic model
that (as shown empirically) converges to efficient resource sharing
decisions at market equilibrium. Our results include extensive
evaluations that illustrate the utility of the proposed framework.
Index Terms—data centers; small cloud; performance; markets
I. INTRODUCTION
Infrastructure-as-a-Service is quickly becoming a ubiquitous
model for providing elastic compute capacity to customers
who can access resources in a pay-as-you-go manner without
long-term commitments, with rapid scaling (up or down)
as needed [1]. Cloud service providers (Amazon AWS [2],
Google Compute Engine [3], and Microsoft Azure [4]) allow
customers to quickly deploy their services without a large
initial infrastructure investment.
Proliferation of smaller-scale clouds. However, there are
some non-trivial concerns in obtaining services from large-
scale public clouds, including cost and complexity. Massive
cloud environments can be costly and inefficient for some
customers, e.g., Blippex [5], thus resulting in more and more
customers building their own smaller-scale clouds (SCs) [6]
for better control of resource usage; e.g., it is hard to guarantee
network performance in large-scale public clouds due to
their multi-tenant environments [7]. Moreover, smaller-scale
providers exhibit a greater flexibility in customizing services
for their users, while large-scale public providers minimize
their management overhead by simplifying their services; e.g.,
Linode [8] distinguishes itself by providing clients with easier
and more flexible service customization. The use of SCs is
one approach to resolving cost and complexity issues.
Despite the potential of SCs, they are likely to suffer from
resource under-provisioning during peak demand, which can
lead to inability to satisfy service level agreements (SLAs)
and consequent loss of customers. SLAs come in many forms,
such as the average or maximum waiting time before being
served, the probability of requests being rejected, and the
amount of resources that each request can obtain. In order
not to resort, similarly to large-scale providers, to resource
over-provisioning, with all its disadvantages, one approach to
realizing the benefits of SCs is to adopt hybrid architectures
[9], [10], that allow private clouds (or small cloud providers)
to outsource their requests to larger-scale public providers.
However, the use of public clouds can potentially be costly
for the small-scale provider.
Motivation. An emerging approach to solving the under-
provisioning problem is for SCs to share their resources in
a federated cloud environment [11]–[21], thus (effectively)
increasing their individual capacities (when needed) without
having to significantly invest in more resources, e.g., this can
be helpful when the SCs do not experience peak workloads
at the same time. Earlier efforts [16], [19] characterize the
benefits of cloud federations, while [17] also demonstrates that
the uncertainty in meeting SLAs can be an incentive enabling
sharing of resources among clouds. Moreover, the ability of
utilize to multiple SCs can avoid single points of failure: when
one SC suffers an outage, others can be accessed to rent
VMs. For instance, on February 28th, 2017, AWS suffered
a five-hour outage in the US, causing an estimated damage of
$150, 000, 000 to S&P500 companies.
However, many of these efforts assume the existence of
the cloud federation and largely focus on designing sharing
policies in order to maximize the profit of individual SCs
[12], [13], [20], [21]. For example, [13] proposes a strategy
to terminate less profitable spot instances, in order to accom-
modate more profitable on-demand VM requests. Moreover,
most works do not consider the trade-off between economical
benefits (in terms of profit) and performance degradation for
individual SCs, which is a significant factor in incentivizing
SCs to participate in the cloud federation. Without the anal-
ysis of performance degradation due to resource sharing, the
feasibility of a federation can be questioned. [14] studies a
federation formation game among cloud providers based on
revenue. However, it only considers a special scenario where
all cloud providers share all their resources with others. Thus,
this work focuses on a fundamental, unanswered question of
“how each SCs should share resources to be profitable without
violating customer SLAs, while also motivating other SCs to
join the federation.”
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Fig. 1. System Overview
Problem description. We consider an environment with mul-
tiple SCs; an example with 3 SCs is depicted in Fig. 1. In
this work, we also refer to SCs sharing resources with each
other as a federation. Each SC has its own SLAs with its
customers: the maximum waiting time before service of a
request is initiated. To satisfy SLAs, SCs use public clouds
as a “backup”, i.e., buy needed resources on-demand from
large-scale public clouds, when in danger of not being able
to meet SLAs. If such SCs form a federation, in the event
that an SC runs out of its resources, it can first use shared
resources from other SCs for a price lower than the price of
using public clouds. The amount of shared resources directly
affects how much workload the federation is able to handle,
which in turn affects the profit each SC is able to achieve.
In this sharing scenario, an important question is: should SCs
participate in the federation? If yes, how much should each
SC share? If an SC is too generous (i.e., shares too many of its
resources), then it may be in danger of not being able to serve
its own workload, resulting in more requests being forwarded
to public clouds thereby reducing profit margins. As a result,
an SC should determine the amount of resources shared based
on the price of selling and buying resources, i.e., the net profit
compared with the cost of using public clouds. However, if an
SC is too selfish, i.e., shares few of its resources for higher
profit, then either it may get removed from the federation for
not being a useful contributor, or the federation may fall apart
if most/all SCs tend towards selfish behavior. Thus, another
critical question that needs to be addressed is: what price can
make each SC share a reasonable amount of resources so that
all SCs will participate in the federation?
Challenges and contributions. To answer these questions, we
make the following contributions:
1) Performance-dependent cost function: Operating costs
of an SC depend on the SLA with its customers and
on the performance achieved inside the federation; in
particular, we need to compute how frequently the SC
will need to allocate external resources to satisfy SLAs
(e.g., maximum waiting time), and whether it will be
able to use resources of other SCs, or only those of
public clouds. In Sect. III-B, we develop a detailed per-
formance model to compute such performance metrics
for each SC. In turn, these metrics allow us to compute
the operating cost of SCs (as defined in Sect. II-B).
To address the high computational complexity of the
detailed performance model (due to its large state
space, which grows exponentially with the number of
SCs), we develop an approximate performance model
(Sect. III-C). This model provides accurate estimates
of the measures of interest, with linear complexity in
the number of SCs, without requiring SCs to leak their
sensitive information.
2) Sharing market design: The sharing mechanism should
motivate SCs to participate, without significant oversight
nor management, i.e., they should find an economic ben-
efit in contributing resources to the federation. We design
a market-based model to determine the price charged
within the federation for the use of shared resources.
The model is based on a non-cooperative, repeated game
among SCs, each being selfish and trying to maximize
its utility; as in real-world scenarios, SCs do not know
the utility of other SCs, but they can compute (using our
approximate performance model) the operating cost that
they would incur for each possible sharing decision. We
determine market equilibrium conditions under which
the federation is successful and market efficiency is
achieved (Sect. IV).
3) Experimental evaluation: In Sect. V, we perform an
extensive experimental evaluation to validate the accu-
racy of our approximate performance model with respect
to simulation, and to verify the existence of market
equilibria. Results highlight errors lower than 10% for
the performance metrics of interest; the proposed pricing
model achieves market equilibria and good economic
efficiency, successfully incentivizing SCs to stay in the
federation.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first work that mod-
els small-cloud federations as a holistic performance-driven
market, integrating engineering aspects (from a performance
model) with economic ones (from a market model).
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
In this section, we first describe the architecture of the SC
federation, illustrated in Fig. 1. We then introduce a definition
of operating costs of SCs. Finally, we describe our sharing
framework, which we call SC-Share.
A. Architecture Description
Each SC has a number of physical servers: through virtual-
ization technology, physical resources (CPU, memory, storage)
of SC i are packed into Ni homogeneous virtual machines
(VMs), which are the resource unit adopted in this work.
Customers request the allocation of individual VMs from SCs;
the arrival process of VM requests at each SC i is modeled
as a Poisson process with rate λi. The service time of each
request at SC i (including the time elapsed from start of VM
preparation until its release by the user) is modeled as an
exponential random variable with rate µi. Each SC processes
VM requests in FCFS order. If physical servers do not have
sufficient resources for a new VM, an SC can reject the
request, queue it until more resources are available, or forward
it to a public cloud (in a hybrid-cloud model). In Sect. VII,
we discuss the details of these assumptions.
In a federation with K SCs (Fig. 1 depicts the case K = 3),
we consider the following general scenario: when all VMs at
an SC are fully occupied, its new VM requests are queued and
can be served either by waiting for local resources to become
available, or by purchasing resources from other SCs in the
federation, or from a public cloud. In order to participate in
the federation, SC i must determine the maximum number of
VMs Si to share with other SCs (at a given price) when idle
VMs are available; i.e., at any time instant, the number of VMs
shared by SC i is ISii ≤ Si. When all its VMs are occupied,
SC i cannot terminate VMs serving requests of other SCs, but
only stops accepting such requests until it is able to clear its
own queue. Each SC i is required to maintain SLAs with its
customers; we assume that this corresponds to a bound on the
waiting time, i.e., a VM needs to be provided by SC i within
Qi time units from its request. If SC i determines that it is
not able to satisfy this SLA using resources of the federation,
it forwards the request to a public cloud (e.g., Amazon AWS).
B. Cost Metric Description
SCs usually make large up-front investments in infrastruc-
ture, and continue to pay for maintenance costs (e.g., power
supply and cooling costs). In addition, SCs need to consider
costs for forwarding requests to public clouds or for using
resources in the federation, in order to satisfy customer SLAs.
We define a cost metric to combine these costs with the
revenue generated by VM requests from other SCs in the
federation, and compute the net operating cost.
Let ISii be a random variable representing the number of
SC i’s VMs per second used by other SCs when SC i shares up
to Si VMs with the federation. Let OSii and P
Si
i be random
variables representing the number VMs per second used by
SC i from the federation and from a public cloud, respectively,
to satisfy its SLAs. The net cost for SC i is then
CSii = P
Si
i · CPi + (OSii − ISii ) · CGi ∀i, (1)
where CPi and C
G
i represent the cost of using a single VM
from a public cloud and from other SCs, respectively. PSii ,
OSii , and I
Si
i are the mean number of VMs per second used
by SC i from a public cloud, by SC i from other SCs, or by
other SCs from SC i, respectively. Here, PSii ·CPi is the cost
(penalty) for not serving requests locally, which drives SCs
to participate in the federation and determines proper sharing
decisions since we assume that CPi > C
G
i . To reduce cost,
by making appropriate sharing decisions, i.e., determining the
number of VMs to share with others, we need a performance
model for each SC, in order to properly estimate PSii , O
Si
i ,
and ISii (see Sect. III for details). Unlike [13], where cloud
providers change VM prices based on system utilization, our
model considers a fixed price CGi for every VM. Since VMs
are homogeneous, we assume that CGi = C
G
j ∀i, j = 1, ...,K,
but each SC can have a different CPi , depending on which pub-
lic cloud it uses. (This assumption is discussed in Sect. VII.)
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Fig. 2. Feedback between two models
Another incentive for participating in the federation is
reducing power cost by forwarding VMs to other SCs when
they offer VMs at cheaper prices than the cost of instantiating
VMs in SC’s own environment. For instance, previous efforts
[16], [22] study the sharing mechanisms for cloud providers
to minimize their costs. However, in this work, we only
focus on the cost of additional resources required to satisfy
customers’ SLAs. Extending the cost function to incorporate
power consumption of executing VMs is a future direction.
C. Cost Metric Evaluation Framework
In order to help SCs determine whether it is beneficial for
them to participate in the federation and share their resources,
we design a framework SC-Share that allows each SC i to
determine the best value of Si, in order to maintain its SLA Qi
and minimize the expected operating cost CSii .
The essence of SC cooperation in such a federation is the
mutual agreement among individual SCs to share their re-
sources (if idle) with other SCs experiencing peak workloads.1
However, the amount of resources Si that each selfish but
honest SC wants to share represents its strategic property that
subsequently affects the cost metric CSii . Thus, in SC-Share,
we develop a market-based model to capture SC interactions
in the federation via a market consisting of K selfish SCs
that interact strategically, and repeatedly over time, via a non-
cooperative game to converge upon stable parameter values.
However, a feedback loop exists between the performance
model and the market model: sharing decisions Si ∀i are
used by the performance model to compute PSii , O
Si
i , and
ISii and evaluate the cost metrics C
Si
i in Eq. (1), which,
in turn, determine the SC utility functions of the market
model governing sharing decisions. Therefore, in SC-Share,
we propose an iterative solution approach, as illustrated in
Fig. 2, involving these two models and their mutual feedback,
to converge upon stable sharing decisions.
III. PERFORMANCE MODEL
In this section, we propose a performance model for SC-
Share that is used to compute performance parameters required
by the cost function of Eq. (1).
A. SC without Sharing Resources
We start with a degenerate case, where an SC does not
participate in the federation and shares no VMs. Based on
SLA requirements, the SC will forward a request to public
clouds if service cannot be started within Qi time units after
its reception. To compute the cost, we need to estimate the
1The issue of enforcing the agreement is beyond our scope here.
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Fig. 3. A Markov model for forwarding
mean number of requests forwarded per second by SC i, P 0i
(we denote it with “0” since no VMs are shared).
To compute P 0i , we use a Markovian model, where the state
represents the number of requests at SC i, as illustrated in
Fig. 3. In this example, we assume that SC i has Ni VMs and
SLA Qi with its customers. When at least one VM is idle,
a new request can be served immediately. However, when all
VMs are busy, the probability that the new request is added to
the queue of SC i (rather than forwarded to a public cloud) is
equal to the probability that service will start in Qi time units,
based on the current number of queued requests. Let qi be the
number of customers in SC i (i.e., max(0, qi−Ni) customers
are waiting in its queue) at the time of the request arrival. Then,
given exponential service times with rate µ and the FCFS
service policy, the probability of queueing the request (instead
of forwarding to a public cloud) is
PNF(qi, Ni, Qi) =
1−
qi−Ni∑
j=0
e−NiµQi ·(NiµQi)j
j! if qi ≥ Ni,
1 if qi < Ni.
In particular, PNF(qi, Ni, Qi) is less than one if the request
cannot be served immediately upon arrival (i.e., qi ≥ Ni).
At the steady state, the expected probability of for-
warding a new request to public clouds is then PF =(∑∞
k=Ni
(1− PNF(k,Ni, Qi)) · pik
)
, where pik is the steady-
state probability of having k requests in the system. Then, the
expected rate at which VM requests are forwarded to public
clouds is P 0i = λ·PF , which can be used in Eq. (1) to compute
the cost for SCs not sharing resources, i.e., with O0i = I
0
i = 0.
B. Detailed Model for SC federation
The model of a federation with sharing is complex. Given a
federation of K SCs, each of which will share a maximum
of Si VMs for i = 1, . . . ,K, our goal is to estimate the
performance parameters PSii , O
Si
i , and I
Si
i for each SC i.
To accurately estimate these parameters, we need to consider
the interaction among SCs in the federation. One approach is
to build a continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC), M, with
the following state space S:
S = {(q1, s1,1, . . . , s1,K , . . . , qK , sK,1, . . . , sK,K) | qi ≥ 0,
0 ≤ si,j ≤ Sj , si,i =
∑
j 6=i
sj,i ≤ Si, for i = 1, . . . ,K},
where qi is the number of requests from SC i’s customers that
are either queued or in service at SC i, si,i is the number of
VMs at SC i serving requests from other SCs, and si,j , i 6= j
is the number of VMs at SC j being used by SC i.
Transition rates between states of M can be assigned so
as to implement the probabilistic forwarding mechanism of
the model for new arrivals, and service of queued requests.
Table I reports the transition structure for the detailed model
M introduced in Section III-B. Transitions are given for SC
i from a generic state
(q1, s1,1, ..., s1,K , ..., qi, si,1, ..., si,K , ..., qK , sK,1, ..., sK,K).
The transition rates include PF (Vi, ni, Qi), which is the
probability that a request is forwarded to a public cloud when
ni requests are queued at SC i, all of its Vi ≤ Ni available
VMs are currently busy, and the maximum allowed waiting
time by the SLA is Qi (see Section III-A for a detailed
definition). We also assume a load balancing mechanism in
the model: SC i determines with which SC j to share an idle
VM by choosing (uniformly at random) among those SCs with
the highest number of queued requests.
Although solving M could give us an accurate prediction
of all performance characteristics required in Eq. (1), the
corresponding state space S grows exponentially with K.
Since re-computation of sharing decisions is needed when
significant changes in workload or resource availability occur,
a model with a more efficient solution is desirable. Moreover,
solving for M requires obtaining detailed SC information
(such as the arrival rate, the number of overall VMs, and the
SLA) that SCs might not want to release. Thus, each SC should
be able to compute the model in a decentralized manner and
release as little information as possible.
C. Approximate Model for SC Federation
In this section, we focus on an approximate model that can
be solved quickly (as system conditions, such as workload,
change) and in a decentralized manner (without releasing too
much information to other SCs), but also yields sufficiently
accurate results, in order to produce appropriate sharing deci-
sions. By analyzing the detailed model M, we realize that
using M allows estimation of performance parameters for
all SCs in the federation simultaneously; however, in realistic
scenarios, each SC computes its own performance parameters
to estimate its cost assuming that other SCs’ sharing decisions
are fixed; thus, there is no need for the performance model
to simultaneously output results for all SCs. Moreover, since
we assume that the same cost is charged by all SCs for
shared VMs, an SC does not need to distinguish the source or
destination of shared VMs. Therefore, we propose a hierarchi-
cal approximate model that computes performance parameters
iteratively.
Given a federation of K SCs, we consider each SC i =
1, . . . ,K in sequence, where SC K is the SC of interest, which
we refer to as target SC in the rest of the paper. At each step,
we build and analyze a Markovian model Mi where only
SCs {1, . . . , i} can access shared resources of the federation.
The model Mi takes into account the solution of Mi−1 and
refines it to include also SC i. For example, in model M1,
the first SC has exclusive access to all shared resources of
the federation; in M2, only SC 1 and SC 2 utilize shared
resources from all SCs, but VM allocations in M1 are taken
into account. We repeat this process until reaching the target
Next State Rate Condition for Transition
(q1, s1,1, ..., s1,K , ..., qi + 1, si,1, ..., si,K , P (qi, si,i)λi (qi + si,i < Ni) ∨ (qj + sj,j ≥ Nj ,∀j 6= i)..., qK , sK,1, ..., sK,K)
(q1, s1,1, ..., s1,K , ...,
λi
|K|
(qi + si,i ≥ Ni)∧
qi, si,1, ..., si,j + 1, ..., si,K , ..., (L = {(ql, sl,l) | ql + sl,l < Nl, sl,l < Sl},∀l 6= i)∧
qj , sj,1, ..., sj,j + 1, ..., sj,K , ..., (K = {(qk, sk,k) | qk + sk,k = minL(ql + sl,l)})
qK , sK,1, ..., sK,K) ∧(qj , sj,j) ∈ K
(q1, s1,1, ..., s1,K , ..., qi − 1, si,1, ..., si,K , ..., min((Ni − si,i), qi)µ (qi + si,i > Ni) ∨ (qj + sj,j ≤ Nj ,∀j 6= i)qj , sj,1, ..., sj,j , ..., sj,K , ...qK , sK,1, ..., sK,K)
(q1, s1,1, ..., s1,K , ...,
min((Ni − si,i), qi)µ
|K|
(qi + si,i ≤ Ni) ∧ (si,i < Si)∧
qi − 1, si,1, ..., si,j + 1, ..., si,K , ..., (L = {(ql, sl,l) | ql + sl,l > Nl},∀l 6= i)∧
qj − 1, sj,1, ..., sj,j , ..., sj,K , ..., (K = {(qk, sk,k) | qk + sk,k = maxL(ql + sl,l)})
qK , sK,1, ..., sK,K) ∧(qj , sj,j) ∈ K
(q1, s1,1, ..., s1,K , ..., qi, si,1, ..., si,j − 1, ..., si,K , si,jµ (qj + sj,j > Ni) ∨ (qk + sk,k ≤ Nk,∀k 6= j)..., qj , sj,1, ..., sj,j − 1, ..., sj,K , ...qK , sK,1, ..., sK,K)
(q1, s1,1, ..., s1,K , ..., qi, si,1, ..., si,j − 1, ..., si,K , ...,
si,jµ
|K|
(qj + sj,j ≤ Nj)∧
qj , sj,1, ..., sj,j , ..., sj,K , ..., (L = {(ql, sl,l) | ql + sl,l > Nl},∀l 6= i)∧
qm, sm,1, ..., sm,j + 1, ..., sm,K , ..., (K = {(qk, sk,k) | qk + sk,k = maxL(ql + sl,l)})
qK , sK,1, ..., sK,K) ∧(qm, sm,m) ∈ K
TABLE I
STATE TRANSITIONS INM FROM STATE (q1, s1,1, ..., s1,K , ..., qi, si,1, ..., si,K , ..., qK , sK,1, ..., sK,K)
SC. In this approach, since SC i only needs the solution
of Mi−1 to build Mi, we allow SCs not to leak sensitive
information on capacity and SLAs. In the following, we give
a detailed description of Mi, 1 ≤ i ≤ K and of its solution.
State Space Si for Mi. The state space Si of Mi is
Si = {(qi, si, oi, ai) | qi ≥ 0, 0 ≤ si ≤ Si, 0 ≤ oi + ai ≤ Bi},
where qi is the total number of requests at SC i (queued or
in service), si is the number of VMs of SC i currently used
to serve requests from SCs {1, . . . , i − 1}, oi is the number
of VMs from other SCs currently used by SC i, and ai is
the number of shared VMs used by SCs in Mi−1. Given that
there are at most Ni VMs in SC i, max(0, qi − (Ni − si))
requests are waiting at SC i; moreover, si is bounded by Si,
the maximum number of VMs shared by SC i. Since Mi
includes SCs {1, . . . , i} and SC i is the target SC in Mi, we
use oi to record the number of shared VMs (not from SC i)
used by SC i, and we use ai to record the number of shared
VMs (not from SC i) used by SCs {1, . . . , i−1}; thus, oi+ai
is bounded by Bi =
∑
j 6=i Sj , the maximum number of VMs
shared by SCs {1, . . . ,K − 1}.
State Transitions. VM allocations in Mi−1 affect the results
of new states inMi after state transitions. Each state transition
happens in the period of time between two events (referred to
as inter-event period in the rest of paper), each of which can
be a request arrival or a service completion instance. During an
inter-event period, each state in Mi can increase the number
of VMs shared by SC i due to SCs in Mi−1 allocating VMs
in SC i; similarly, the number of requests queued at SC i can
decrease due to service completions in Mi−1, which allow
SC i to utilize shared VMs. Thus, the probability of going
to any destination state from a state of Mi depends on the
probability of being at a specific state in Mi−1. Here, we
define three interaction probability vectors representing the
probability of moving from each state (qi, si, oi, ai) ofMi to
any other state of Mi when an event happens, based on the
interaction probabilities computed for Mi−1:
• PA(qi, si, oi, ai) for an inter-event period preceding an
arrival instance;
• PDloc(qi, si, oi, ai) for an inter-event period preceding a
local departure instance;
• PDrem(qi, si, oi, ai) for an inter-event period preceding the
remote departure instance of a VM allocated at other SCs
by SC i.
The detailed computation of these interaction probability vec-
tors is described below.
Let aloc represent the number of VMs shared by
SC i and allocated by SCs {1, . . . , i − 1} in Mi−1,
and let arem represent the number of VMs shared
by all other SCs (except SC i) and allocated by
SCs {1, . . . , i − 1} in Mi−1, respectively. Then, given a
state in Mi−1, which can produce the pair (aloc, arem),
PA(qi, si, oi, ai)(aloc,arem), P
D
loc(qi, si, oi, ai)(aloc,arem), and
PDrem(qi, si, oi, ai)(aloc,arem) represent the probability of
allocating VMs (aloc, arem) in vectors PA(qi, si, oi, ai),
PDloc(qi, si, oi, ai), and P
D
rem(qi, si, oi, ai), respectively, after
an event in the state (qi, si, oi, ai) ofMi. The legal combina-
tions of the pairs (aloc, arem) are determined by the current
state (qi, si, oi, ai) of Mi, as described below. For simplicity,
in the rest of paper we use PA(aloc,arem), P
D
loc(aloc,arem)
,
and PDrem(aloc,arem) to represent the probability of VM al-
locations in Mi−1 for each state (aloc, arem), given the state
(qi, si, oi, ai) of Mi.
Transitions for M1. In M1, there is only one SC, and no
other model affecting the transitions; thus, s1 = a1 = 0, and
(q1, 0, o1, 0)
λ−→ (q1 + 1, 0, o1, 0) if q1 < N1
(q1, 0, o1, 0)
λ−→ (q1, 0, o1 + 1, 0) if q1 ≥ Ni ∧ o1 < B1
(q1, 0, o1, 0)
λ·PNF(q1,N1,Q1)−−−−−−−−−−−−→ (q1 + 1, 0, o1, 0) if q1 ≥ Ni ∧ o1 = B1
(q1, 0, o1, 0)
min(q1,N1)·µ−−−−−−−−−→ (q1 − 1, 0, o1, 0) if q1 > 0
(q1, 0, o1, 0)
o1·µ−−−→ (q1, 0, o1 − 1, 0) if o1 > 0
Transitions forMi. Any transition inMi with i > 1 depends
on interaction probability vectors for Mi−1. Given any pair
(aloc, arem) from states in Mi−1, the transitions correspond-
ing to a request arrival instance at state (qi, si, oi, ai) in Mi
fall into one of the following cases:
C1: The new request can use a VM at SC i when there is at
least one free VM at SC i, even after considering aloc and
arem from Mi−1 during the arrival period:
(qi, si, oi, ai)
λ·PA(aloc,arem)−−−−−−−−−−→ (qi + 1, aloc, oi, arem)
for all qi+aloc < Ni such that (aloc ≤ Si)∧(oi+arem ≤ Bi).
C2: The new request uses a VM from other SCs. This situation
arises when SC i has no idle VMs prior to this arrival
instance, but other SCs can provide at least one VM during
the preceding inter-event period:
(qi, si, oi, ai)
λ·PA(aloc,arem)−−−−−−−−−−→ (qi, aloc, oi + 1, arem)
for all qi + aloc ≥ Ni and oi + arem + 1 ≤ Bi.
C3: The new request must be queued or forwarded to a public
cloud due to no available shared VMs in the federation, where
all VMs have been occupied during the previous or current
inter-event period by requests from other SCs:
(qi, si, oi, ai)
λ·PA(aloc,arem)
·P NF(qi,Vi,Qi)−−−−−−−−−−→ (qi + 1, aloc, oi, arem)
for all qi+aloc ≥ Ni and oi+arem = Bi. Vi = Ni−si+oi is
the number of VMs in the federation currently used by SC i.
Given any pair (aloc, arem) for states in Mi−1, the transi-
tions corresponding to a service completion instance at SC i
for its own customers fall into one of the following cases:
C4: The departure is from VMs of SC i used by SC i itself.
If there is at least one job queued in SC i, the freed VM will
be used by SC i directly:
(qi, si, oi, ai)
Li·µ·PDloc(aloc,arem)−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ (qi − 1, aloc, oi, arem),
where Li = min(qi, Ni−si) is the number of VMs from SC i
used by SC i, for all qi + aloc > Ni. However, if there are
no queued requests in SC i, the freed VM will be assigned to
other SCs with queued jobs:
(qi, si, oi, ai)
Li·µ·PDloc(aloc,arem)−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ (qi − 1, aloc + 1, oi, arem)
for all qi + aloc ≤ Ni. If other SCs do not have queued
requests, the transition has the same form as in the previous
case for queued requests at SC i.
C5: The departure is from VMs of other SCs allocating to
SC i. If there are no queued jobs in any SCs, the freed VM
will be returned directly:
(qi, si, oi, ai)
oi·µ·PDrem(aloc,arem)−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ (qi, aloc, oi − 1, arem)
for all qi + aloc ≤ Ni. If at least one request is queued in
SC 1
SC K-1
SC K
Non-shared 
VMs
Shared VMs
... MK-1
MK
M1...
Fig. 4. Example of allocation constraints for a state (qi, si, oi, ai) in Mi
SCs {1, . . . , i− 1}, SC i must share the VM:
(qi, si, oi, ai)
oi·µ·PDrem(aloc,arem)−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ (qi, aloc, oi − 1, arem + 1).
However, if the above conditions are not satisfied and there is
at least one job queued in SC i, the VM will still be assigned
to SC i, for all qi + aloc > Ni:
(qi, si, oi, ai)
oi·µ·PDrem(aloc,arem)−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ (qi − 1, aloc, oi, arem).
Interaction Probabilities. As mentioned above, the interac-
tion probabilities describe the probability of different VM
allocations from SCs in Mi−1 during an inter-event period
of Mi. To compute transient probabilities, which describe
transient changes in the number of VM allocations in CTMC
Mi−1 over inter-event periods at SC i, we use the method of
uniformization [23] to transform the CTMC into a discrete-
time Markov chain and a Poisson process as follows: given
the infinitesimal generator Qi−1,
• the rate of the Poisson process is γ ≥ maxj
∣∣qi−1jj ∣∣,
• the transition matrix of the DTMC is P i−1 = I+ 1γQ
i−1.
Then, the transient probability vector pi−1(t) for Mi−1 can
be computed for all t ≥ 0 as pi−1(t) = p0P i−1(t), where
P i−1(t) =
∑∞
k=0
e−γt(γt)k
k! (P
i−1)k is the matrix of transition
probabilities for the CTMC (for a given precision , the
summation can be truncated using the Fox and Glynn method
[24]). By letting p0 be equal to the initial state distribution at
any time instance, we can compute transient state changes of
Mi−1.
Initial State Distribution. The initial distribution of Mi−1
depends on VM allocations in the current state of Mi. For
instance, as illustrated in Fig. 4, when Si = 3 and SC i uses 2
of its shared VMs in state (qi, si, oi, ai) of Mi, only up to 1
of the remaining SC i’s shared VMs can be allocated to others
in Mi−1.
We represent the initial distribution of Mi−1 over its state
space Si−1 as piX[(qi,si,oi,ai)], where [(qi, si, oi, ai)] is the subset
of states in Si−1 that satisfy VM allocation constraints for
a given state (qi, si, oi, ai) of Mi. The initial state distri-
bution piX[(qi,si,oi,ai)] of Mi−1 is computed from its steady-
state probabilities by considering only states [(qi, si, oi, ai)]
and renormalizing their probability masses. Then, interaction
probability vectors forMi−1 andMi are given by the product
of the initial state distribution and transient state change during
the average inter-arrival time or departure time:
PA(qi, si, oi, ai) =
(
piX[(qi,si,oi,ai)]P (
1
λi
)
)
PDloc(qi, si, oi, ai) =
(
piX[(qi,si,oi,ai)]P (
1
Liµ
)
)
PDrem(qi, si, oi, ai) =
(
piX[(qi,si,oi,ai)]P (
1
oiµ
)
)
where Li is the number of local busy VMs in (qi, si, oi, ai).
The initial state distribution piX[(qi,si,oi,ai)] is computed through
the concept of Conditional Probability Distribution [25].
Performance Parameters. Given that pii represents the
steady-state probabilities of Mi, the performance parameters
can be computed as follows:
ISii =
∑
si · pii(qi,si,oi,ai), OSii =
∑
oi · pii(qi,si,oi,ai),
PSii = λi ·
(∑
(1− P NF(q′i, Vi, Qi)) · pii(qi,si,oi,ai)
)
,
where q′i = qi − (Ni − si) and Vi = Ni − si + oi.
IV. MARKET-BASED MODEL
Next, we develop the empirical market-based model for SC-
Share to determine appropriate sharing decisions for each SC.
We first formulate SC utility functions that take performance
characteristics (as computed above) into consideration. We
then focus on the details of the game and on the notion of
market efficiency.
A. SC Utilities
As discussed before, SCs participate in the federation in
order to obtain resources and satisfy SLAs at prices cheaper
than public clouds, and sell idle resources to other SCs for
profit, similarly to spot instances sold by Amazon AWS [26].
To this end, we define SC i’s utility USii (see Eq. (2) below)
from the ratio between (a) the change in net cost of an SC
when it participates in the federation versus when it does not,
and (b) the change in utilization of an SC when it participates
in the federation versus when it does not:
USii =
(max(C0i − CSii , 0))
2
(ρSii − ρ0i )
γ 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, (2)
where C0i is the cost for SC i when it does not participate in the
federation, CSii is the cost for SC i when it shares a maximum
of Si VMs, ρ0i is the system utilization (i.e., the fraction of
time that SC i’s VMs are busy) when not participating in the
federation, and ρSii is the utilization of SC i when it shares
a maximum of Si VMs. It is evident that an SC will try to
minimize its cost for satisfying SLAs; thus, we consider the
cost reduction as the numerator of Eq. (2). We consider the
increment in SCs’ utilizations (the denominator of Eq. (2))
because SCs always want to keep utilizing their resources in
a certain level (the system utilization of SCs should always
increase since all of them have to share resources with others
in order to participate in the federation). For instance, an
SC would want to increase the amount of shared VMs (i.e.,
increase its system utilization) to obtain higher profit from the
ALGORITHM 1: Proposed repeated game among SCs
Input: CPi , CGi , SC {1, ...,K}
Output: {S1, ..., SK}
SC i has Ni VMs, arrival rate λi and SLA requirement Qi;
In round r = 0, SC VM sharing vector is {S(0)1 , ..., S(0)K };
do
r = r + 1;
foreach i ∈ 1, ...,K do
S
(r)
i ← the shared VM number which maximizes
SC i’s utility based on S(r−1)j , ∀j 6= i, CPi , CGi ;
end
while ∃i ∈ {1, ...,K}, S(r)i 6= S(r−1)i ;
{S(r)1 , ..., S(r)K } is the equilibrium point;
cooperation, but would like to decrease the amount of shared
VMs whenever its high system utilization makes it forward
more requests to a public cloud (i.e., the rate of cost reduction
starts to decrease). The parameter γ in Eq. (2) reflects the
importance SC i places on utilization, where γ = 0 means
SC i only considers cost reduction, referred to as UF 0 in
the rest of the paper, and γ = 1 means SC i considers the
marginal cost reduction for utilization changes as the most
important factor, referred to as UF 1 in the rest of the paper
(γ = 1 gives highest importance to utilization increase since
0 < ρSii − ρ0i ≤ 1). We choose such structure for USii so that
an SC will always try to reduce cost, and the marginal utility
is linear in (C0i −CSii ). In the experiments, we assume that all
SCs in the federation have the same value for the γ parameter,
as different values would produce different scales of utility.
B. Non-Cooperative Game Among SCs
Game Setting. We implement a finite repeated non-
cooperative game, where the strategy parameter Si of each
SC i is the maximum number of VMs shared with other SCs
at any given time. Here, we adapt the concept of fictitious
play [27], and assume that each SC does not need to know
the utility functions of others. SC i determines Si based on
the performance characteristics achieved through sharing with
others in the previous round of the game, resulting in a corre-
sponding cost of maintaining the required SLAs. Algorithm 1
describes the details of our non-cooperative repeated game. In
the initial round (without knowledge of other SCs’ behavior),
each SC makes an initial sharing decision arbitrarily, and
begins sharing VMs with other SCs. Given the solution of
the performance model (which takes {S(0)1 , ..., S(0)K } as input),
each SC maximizes its utility, to determine S(1)i , its sharing
decision for the next round. Using its new sharing decision
and those from other SCs (S(1)j , ∀j 6= i) from the previous
round, SC i maximizes its utility again, to determine a new
sharing decision S(2)i . This continues until the game converges
to an equilibrium point, as explained next.
Analyzing Market Equilibria. A Nash equilibrium point of
our proposed repeated game represents the game state in which
no SC has any incentive to improve its sharing decision [28].
In our work, we are primarily interested in pure strategy Nash
Equilibria (NE) [28] as it is more practical to implement and
realize for a detailed reasoning. More importantly, we have
designed utility functions for the SCs that take as arguments,
parameters that are practically relevant to our problem, and are
expressions that best reflect SC satisfaction levels. However, in
the process, we could not strictly preserve salient mathematical
properties related to the utility functions that allow us to derive
closed form results about Market Equilibria (ME) from exist-
ing seminal works in micro-economic theory, forcing us to take
an experimental stance to characterize equilibria. Below, we
briefly rationalize our stance in the light of the inapplicability
of seminal game-theory theorems in characterizing ME in our
work. A detailed explanation of our rationale (along with a
description of the salient mathematical properties) is in the
Appendix A.
First, deriving closed form results for our work via the
seminal result by Nash is not possible due to us (a) dealing
with only pure strategy NE, and (b) the utility for an SC might
not be quasi-concave [29] in general cases. Second, deriving
closed form results for our work via the seminal result by
Debreu, Fan, and Glicksberg (derived independently) [30]–
[32] in relation to pure strategy NE is not possible due to (a’)
the quasi-concavity assumption might not always be satisfied
(for the peer utility function), which in turn might not guar-
antee pure strategy NE (violating theorem assumptions), and
(b’) strategy sets in many applications (including specialized
versions of our application setting, i.e., the number of shared
VMs is discrete in nature) might not be continuous and infinite
[28], in which case, we would have to go back to using Nash’s
theorem to guarantee mixed strategy NE (which we do not aim
to achieve). Finally, deriving closed form results for our work
via the strong seminal result by Dasgupta and Maskin [33]
(that also accounts for discontinuous utility functions) is not
possible due to the same reasons in (a) and (b) above.
Despite barriers to closed form analysis, we observe through
simulation results (see below) the existence of pure strategy
NE for infinite strategy spaces (simulated in a discrete manner,
thereby becoming a finite game in simulation), and for non
quasi-concave SC utility functions. Thus, at least from the
experimental results, we observe that for our work, (i) it is not
necessary (via the theorem of Nash) for quasi concavity to hold
for a pure strategy (also discounting the guarantee of only a
mixed strategy via Nash’s theorem) Nash equilibrium to exist,
and (ii) it is not necessary (via the theorem of Debreu et al.)
for quasi concavity to hold for a pure strategy (also discounting
the infinite strategy space assumption via the theorem by
Debreu et al., as the simulation is discrete in nature) Nash
equilibrium to exist.
Reaching Market Equilibria. As addressed above, since
we could not afford a mathematical proof, in this work, we
simulate the game in Algorithm 1 and determine the equilib-
rium point empirically for a specific price setting (CPi and
CGi ). A traditional heuristic to search for one such equilibium
point in the game is the numerical Taˆtonnement process [34]
that is based on the principle of gradient descent. In our
work, due to the discrete nature of the SC strategy elements
(e.g., # of VMs to share), we need a discrete version of a
Taˆtonnement process to reach an equilibrium point. However,
the design and analysis of such a process has been shown to be
quite challenging [35]; moreover there is no existing discrete
Taˆtonnement process to the best of our knowledge. Thus, in
our market-based model, we use the non-gradient based Tabu
Search heuristic [36] to search for an equilibrium value of
S
(r)
i , and reach the global optimum in most cases (by starting
at different initial points).
Fairness Among SCs. A joint social end goal, serving as a
benchmark of how well selfish non-cooperative SCs participate
in the federation w.r.t. their sharing behavior, is to (a) reach
a certain level of fairness (see below for details) among SCs
in terms of their utilities, and (b) maximize their individual
utilities at ME. It is important to note here that if we only
compare the fairness allocations among SCs, the scenario
where all SCs share nothing with others can also be a most
fair allocation, but it results in sub-optimal individual utilities
(at times an individual utility of zero for the SCs) at ME (see
Sect. V-B). To achieve our joint social end goal, we need to
find a specific price setting (the ratio of CGi and C
P
i ) that
enables all SCs to maximize their utilities through sharing
VMs while at the same time maintaining an appropriate level
of fairness. In regard to adopting an appropriate fairness
measure, we consider in our work the widely popular notion
of weighted α-fairness [37] to combine individual SC utilities
USii through the function
W (α,
−→
Si,
−−→
USii ) =
{∑K
k=1 Si
(U
Si
i )
1−α
1−α α ≥ 0, α 6= 1;∑K
k=1 Si logU
Si
i α = 1.
(3)
Here, Si, the maximum number of shared VMs, is the weight
used to combine the α-fairness metric of each SC i, while the
parameter α controls the fairness of utility allocations among
SCs. In this work, we evaluate three popular α-fairness utility
functions, achieving different trade-offs between fairness and
economic efficiency: (i) α = 0, which gives the utilitarian
function [38] (denoting minimum fairness), (ii) α =∞, which
results in max-min fairness, and (iii) α = 1, which gives
proportional fairness. For each fairness function defined by
α, our goal is to find the best price setting that motivates SCs,
based on their system loads, to participate in the federation and
share more of their VMs, i.e., thereby achieving higher values
of α-fair functions. We assume that SCs always report the true
decisions and utility without releasing detailed information.
(The design of an economic mechanism to enforce truthful
communication between SCs is beyond the scope here.)
V. EVALUATION AND VALIDATION
We first validate the accuracy of our performance model,
the results of which are needed as input parameters to the
market-based model. To this end, we compute the solution of
our approximate model (in Sect. III) numerically, and compare
it to the solution of the exact model (computed through a
C++-based simulator). We then use our market-based model
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Fig. 5. Comparing the result of forwarding estimation in 10 and 100 VMs
with QoS = 0.2 and 0.5.
to investigate how the price of using shared VMs from other
SCs affects achieving higher summation of weighted utilities.
A. Performance model validation
SC without Sharing Resources. Here, we start with the
accuracy evaluation of our forward probability estimation in
Sect. III-A, since this is a measure used by all other models.
Moreover, to demonstrate that SCs have more incentives to
participate in the federation, we compare the results of two
clouds, which have 10 and 100 VMs respectively, with the
SLAs of Qi = 0.2 and Qi = 0.5 under various Poisson
arrival rates; each request has an exponential service time
with rate 1. In order to correctly compare the results among
two SCs, in Fig. 5, we show the estimated forward proba-
bility under different system utilizations (by increasing the
arrival rate). As shown in the figure, for both clouds, the
probability of forwarding is higher for smaller QoS values,
and our estimation properly predicts the forward probability
under different settings. It is easy to see that the cloud with
fewer VMs has higher forwarding probability under the same
system utilization. Thus, if an SC does not want to increase
its investments in infrastructure, it needs some mechanism
to decrease its forwarding probability to reduce the cost of
satisfying SLAs. In the following experiments, each SC in the
federation has 10 VMs by default with exponential service
time with rate µ = 1 and QoS Qi = 0.2.
Approximate Model. In this section, we performed extensive
experiments to validate the accuracy of the approximate model
presented in Sect. III-C. Here, we want to investigate how well
our approximate model performs as a function of the different
number of shared VMs and system utilizations.
We begin with a 2-SC federation scenario. We fix the arrival
rate of one SC to 7 and the number of shared VMs to 5 (total
10 VMs), and vary the number of shared VMs and system
load (by changing the arrival rate) of another SC, referred to as
target SC. Figures 6a and 6b illustrate the performance metrics
of interest when the target SC shares 1 and 9 VM(s) under
different system loads. (Due to lack of space, we omit PSii
as its estimation remains accurate.) As shown in the figures,
the exact and approximate ISii and O
Si
i are nearly the same
when the target SC shares very few VMs. The inaccuracy of
our approximate model grows when the target SC shares more
VMs (as compared to a scenario with 1 shared VM), but is still
within 10%. Thus, the difference between ISii and O
Si
i (see
Eq. (1)) remains accurate (within 10% of the exact solution).
We now illustrate how the approximation error grows
in larger systems. Firstly, we consider a 10-SC federa-
tion scenario (each with a total of 10 VMs), and fix 9
SCs’ settings, which have the following number of shared
VMs (3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1), and corresponding arrival rate
(7, 7, 7, 8, 8, 8, 9, 9, 9). Figures 6c and 6d illustrate the perfor-
mance metrics of interest when the target SC shares 1 and 5
VM(s) under different system loads. We still observe that the
difference between the exact and approximate ISii and O
Si
i
remains small (within 10% of the exact solution) when the
system utilization is lower than 0.8 (within 20% when the
system utilization is lower than 0.9). Generally, we can observe
that the results of approximated ISii are under-estimated when
the system has very high utilization because our approximate
model breaks the direct relationship between the target SC
and all other SCs (we only consider the connection between
SC i and SC i− 1); thus, the target SC might under-estimate
the number of queued requests at all other SCs. For the same
reason, the results of approximated OSii are over-estimated.
However, the difference between ISii and O
Si
i remains accurate
(within 20% of the exact solution) when the system utilization
is lower than 0.9. Second, we consider again a 2-SC federation
scenario, with 100 VMs per SC. We fix the the number of
shared VMs at 10 for both SCs, and vary system load for
both of them. Figures 6e and 6f illustrate the performance
metrics of interest when one SC has system utilization of 0.8
and 0.9 under different system loads of the target SC. We
still observe that the difference between ISii and O
Si
i remains
accurate (within 20% of the exact solution) when the system
utilization of the target SC is lower than 0.9.
Summary. Our extensive experiments indicate that our ap-
proximate model estimates ISii and O
Si
i within 20% of the
exact solution, under a variety of scenarios, while saving
significant computation time. More importantly, the accuracy
of the difference between ISii and O
Si
i , and P
Si
i , which are the
parameters needed by the market-based model, are within 10%
of the exact solution when the system utilization is reasonable.
Overall, we believe that our approximate model is useful in
estimating performance characteristics of the federation, as
needed in the market-based model.
B. Market-based Model Evaluation
Here, we perform experiments to investigate how C
G
i
CPi
, USii ,
and W (α,
−→
Si,
−−→
USii ), affect the criteria for SCs to participate in
the federation. Due to lack of space, we focus on evaluating
3-SC scenarios(in Fig. 7), where each SC has 10 VMs (as a
representative example) in the evaluation, to better explain the
effects of system utilizations on the game model; results for
other SC-scenarios are qualitatively similar. Here, we display
the ratio of the achieved value of the W metric (see Sect IV-B)
to the (empirical) market efficient value of the W metric, as
a measure of federation efficiency, for a given mixture of SC
utility functions. If no SCs are willing to participate in the
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Fig. 6. Validating approx. perf. model (2 SCs and 10 SCs)
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Fig. 7. Market results in 3-SC scenarios: (a)(b) are results where 3 SCs
have ρi = 0.58, 0.73, 0.84, (c) is the result where 3 SCs have ρi =
0.73, 0.79, 0.84, (d) are the results where 3 SCs have ρi = 0.49, 0.58, 0.66
federation, we depict it as zero federation efficiency (since the
value of the W metric is always greater than zero).
We first consider scenarios where the 3 SCs have signif-
icantly different system loads (ρi = 0.58, 0.73, 0.84). Fig.
7a illustrates the case where all SCs choose UF0 (γ = 0)
as their utility function; Fig. 7b illustrates the case where
all SCs choose UF1 (γ = 1) as their utility function. As
shown in the figures, if all SCs chooses UF 0, the utilitarian
W metric increases with increase in CGi /C
P
i (except when
CGi /C
P
i is nearing 1), since the SCs choosing UF0 as their
utility are incentivized to share more VMs to reduce their net
cost. When CGi /C
P
i is nearing 1, the federation cannot be
formed because SCs with high utilizations do not reduce cost
through using shared VMs, compared to that when resorting to
a public cloud, and low utilization SCs do not generate enough
demand to make high utilization SCs remain profitable. If all
SCs use UF 1, they would only share 1 VM with others even
when CGi /C
P
i increases because, in our setting, the increase
in marginal cost reduction with increase in number of shared
VMs is not sufficient to encourage SCs to contribute more
VMs. Moreover, since all SCs only shared 1 VM when they
use UF 1, both proportional W metric and max-min W metric
achieve the same maximum state (due to the same weight for
all SCs in Eq. (3)), as shown in Fig. 7b. In other cases, the
results of the proportional W metric depend on the behavior of
the lower utilization SCs. If these SCs choose UF 0, their cost
reductions with increase in number of shared VMs are greater
than high utilization SCs; thus, the maximum proportional W
metric can only happen when all SCs share few VMs.
In Fig. 7c, we consider scenarios where 3 SCs have similarly
high system loads (ρi = 0.73, 0.79, 0.84), where all of them
consider UF 0. In this scenario, the results are similar to the
cases in Fig. 7a; however, unlike the scenario where SCs
having significant different utilizations are not incentivized to
join the federation when CGi /C
P
i = 1, SCs in a scenario
when they have similar high utilizations, are incentivized to
cooperate when CGi /C
P
i = 1. This is because high utilization
SCs share similar number of VMs with each other, resulting
in canceling out the cost of using shared VMs. In Fig. 7d, we
consider scenarios where 3 SCs have similarly median system
loads (ρi = 0.49, 0.58, 0.66), where all of them consider UF 1.
The results in these scenarios are similar to what we have
discussed above, however, we observe the federation cannot
be formed when CGi /C
P
i is beyond ≈ 0.8. This is because all
low utilization SCs do not generate enough revenue from their
incoming VM demand from other SCs to offset their costs of
using shared VMs from other SCs.
Summary. Our extensive experimental evaluation indicates
three CGi /C
P
i regions of operation to maximize various W
metrics. When maximizing proportional fairness based W
metric is the goal of the federation, the value of CGi /C
P
i
should be set in the lower range of CGi /C
P
i (between 0 and 0.3
in our example setting). When maximizing max-min fairness
based W metric is the goal, the value of CGi /C
P
i should be
set in the middle range of CGi /C
P
i (between 0.3 and 0.7 in
our example setting). Finally, when maximizing utilitarian W
metric is the goal, the value of CGi /C
P
i should be set in the
high range of CGi /C
P
i (between 0.7 and 1 in our example
setting). However, the utilitarian setting also runs the risk of
breaking the federation at a certain high value of CGi /C
P
i at
which no SC would be willing to cooperate.
C. Computational Overhead
Here, we discuss the cost of computing our performance
model and the market-based model.
Performance Model: Our approximate model can signif-
icantly reduce the state space of the Markov model (see
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Fig. 8. Time complexity of the performance model and the game model
Sect. III-C). For instance, in a 10-SC scenario with each SC
sharing 5 VMs, the detailed model has ≈ 9-billion states,
whose generation and solution requires a substantial amount of
space and computation time. However, our approximate model
only needs to build ten Markov models with ≈ 1-million states
each, and solve the corresponding matrices. Fig. 8a illustrates
the computation time of the approximate model with 2 − 10
SCs, each with 10 VMs and sharing 2 VMs. We observe that
the computation time increases with the number of SCs due to
generating and solving larger matrices. Since our approximate
model significantly reduces the state space, it can estimate the
results faster and with less memory.
Market-based Model: SCs use Algorithm 1 to repetitively
adjust their sharing decisions, Si, at each round of the game in
order to maximize its utility until reaching an equilibrium state
(see Sect. IV-B); thus, the market-based model’s computational
time depends on the Tabu Search distance and the number of
SCs. We consider scenarios with 2− 8 SCs in the federation,
each with 100 VMs. The number of iterations required de-
creases as more SCs participate (see Fig. 8b). This occurs
because any decision change results in a bigger influence
in a smaller federation. Similarly, a larger search distance’s
influence is bigger in a smaller federation. For example, our
proposed market-based model needs ≈ 5 iterations to reach
equilibrium when only 2 SCs are in the federation.
VI. RELATED WORK
We give an overview of efforts related to ours and highlight
the relevant differences. Works on hybrid clouds [9], [10]
are related as they allow private (or smaller-scale) clouds
to outsource their requests to large-scale public providers.
However, since that can potentially be costly for a small-
scale provider, our work differs in that it focuses on a sharing
framework, while minimizing cost of using public clouds.
Earlier efforts also study the competition and cooperation
within a federated cloud. For instance, authors in [16], [20]
characterize the cloud federation to help cloud providers
maximize their profits via dynamic pricing models. Earlier
efforts [15], [39] also study the competition and cooperation
among cloud providers, but assume that each cloud provider
has sufficient resources to serve all users’ requests, while [15]
incorporates a penalty function to address the service delay
penalty. Authors in [40] propose a hierarchical cooperative
game theoretic model for better resources integration and
achieving a higher profit in the federation. Similar to our
work, [14] studies a federation formation game but assumes
that cloud providers share everything with others, while [19]
adopts cooperative game theoretic approaches to model a cloud
federation and study the motivation for cloud providers to
participate in a federation.
Another line of work focuses on designing sharing policies
in the federation to obtain higher profit. For instance, [18]
proposes a decentralized cloud platform SpotCloud [41] -
a real-world system allowing customers or SCs to sell idle
compute resources at specified prices - and presents a resource
pricing scheme (resulting from a repeated seller game) plus an
optimal resource provisioning algorithm. [12] employs various
cooperation strategies under varying workloads, to reduce
the request rejection rate (i.e., the efficiency metric in [12]).
Another effort [13] trade-off the approaches of outsourcing
resources and rejecting less profitable in order to increase
resource utilization and profit. [21] proposes to efficiently
deploy distributed applications on federated clouds by consid-
ering security requirements, the cost of computing power, data
storage and inter-cloud communication. [11] groups resources
of various SCs into computational units, in order to serve
customers’ requests. [17] proposes to incorporate both histor-
ical and expected future revenue into VM sharing decisions in
order to maximize an SC’s profit.
Differences and Drawbacks. Our work differs from previous
efforts in that we explicitly consider consequences of resource
sharing on the resulting performance delivered to customers.
In contrast, none of the above efforts explicitly model the
system performance under the considered resource sharing
environment. They either assume that resources can be re-
claimed (when needed), thus resulting in lack of reliability of
shared resources or they assume that an analytical performance
characterization is possible (but do not propose a solution to
estimate it). Such an analytical characterization is an important
contribution of our work. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first work addressing the explicit interactions between
performance model and economic model. Moreover, unlike
previous efforts, that adopt the cooperative game theoretic
approach, our work studying the non-cooperative game is more
practical since likely no SC would be willing to share their
utility specific information with others.
VII. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
We made a number of assumptions in our models; here, we
discuss the rationale behind the main assumptions.
Homogeneous VMs. In practice, each cloud provider offers
heterogeneous VM profiles (e.g., memory-optimized, CPU-
optimized, or GPU-enabled), which reserve hardware re-
sources on pre-specified machine pools shared by multiple
VMs [42]. However, many cloud providers, such as Amazon
LightSail, DigitalOcean, and Linode, offer VM configurations
with very similar specifications (e.g., $10/month instances
from Linode, DigitalOcean, and Amazon Lightsail currently
provide 1 CPU core, 30 GB SSD, 2 TB data transfer/month,
1 or 2 GB of RAM). We believe that it is very likely that
SCs would negotiate the sharing policies for each VM profile
separately, given that these profiles correspond to different
prices and capacities at each SC. In this case, our model of
homogeneous resources can be applied repeatedly to each VM
profile. Sharing policies for hardware resources (rather than
VM profiles) would require the introduction of scheduling and
packing algorithms within our performance model, which is
beyond the scope of this work.
I.I.D. Exponential Service Times. Depending on the target
application, requests can require two or more VMs to complete
a job, and service times of different requests likely have
different distributions. In these cases, our Markov model can
address non-exponential service times by introducing phase-
type distributions that fit the moments of service time distribu-
tions from real-world traces [43]. Similarly, batch arrivals can
introduce with batch Markovian arrival processes (BMAPs).
Unfortunately, both approaches result in larger state spaces,
with the effect of increasing computation costs for the analysis
of our performance model. In this paper, we motivated the
formation of a federation using exponentially-distributed ser-
vice times and single-VM requests to reduce the computational
cost. To relax these assumptions, one of our future goals
focuses on leveraging symbolic analysis methods for Markov
chains, e.g., methods based on multi-terminal binary decision
diagrams (MTBDDs), or lumping of Markov processes, to
further cope with the state-space explosion.
Stable System Parameters. This work focuses on establishing
a long-term relationship in the federation: in reality, unlike spot
clouds, where decisions must be made in a very short period
of time, each SC would collect sufficient historical traces for
a longer period of time before joining the federation, and
update its sharing decisions after observing a long-term change
in system parameters. Our approximate model is designed to
deliver the results for this kinds of updates.
Participating in single federation. In real world, an SC can
participate in multiple cloud federations simultaneously, and
that sharing decisions for different federations might depend
on many factors, such as the cost of using shared VMs in
federations. However, this paper focuses on studying how
the price of using shared resources affects the motivation of
participating in the federation; profit maximization through the
use of the resources from multiple federations is outside of the
scope of this work, but it could represent future work.
The feasibility of Taˆtonnement process. According to [44],
when mixed strategies are considered, the results of the
Taˆtonnement process might be unstable, which does not hap-
pen with pure strategies. This entails (as one of the reasons)
the use of pure strategies in practical settings. However, not
all games will have pure strategy equilibria, but they will
definitely have mixed strategy equilibria. In such situations, the
Taˆtonnement process to reach a pure strategy equilibria will
not terminate, indicating the possibility of the non-existence
of a pure strategy NE. Currently, we do not have a good
solution to overcome this problem. In addition, in all of our
settings we reach a pure strategy NE. Given the assumption
that we only deal with pure strategies in our game, the results
from the Taˆtonnement process depend on the initial point,
particularly when there are more equilibria in the game. Thus,
in our game, we have tried different initial points, and picked
the equilibrium that produced a better fairness level among
SCs. Throughout our experiments, we can always find an
equilibrium in the game. However, as discussed in the previous
comment, the existence of an equilibrium significantly depends
on the utilities of SCs.
SCs follow the sequence of actions. We stress the fact that it
is in the rational interest of users to follow the sequence/order
as specified by the game. However, in the worst case, even
if users deviate from following the prescription, it is very
unlikely that all users would do that at the same time. In
the event that even a few players follow the sequence/order
as specified by the game, we would end up with a better
outcome than no-sharing. On an individual level, we agree
with the reviewer that some players might end up having a
worse outcome than the scenario with no-sharing if they do
not make new decisions (e.g., leave the federation) when they
have to sustain higher costs than in the case of not participating
to the federation. However, each SC can have a better utility
than in the scenario with no sharing as long as its decision
can reduce the cost of serving customers, even when this SC
does not constantly update its decision.
No collusion among SCs. It is possible in practice for certain
SCs to collude among themselves to ‘game’ the cloud sharing
system so that these SCs benefit more in terms of resource
availability at cheaper costs, than the others. It is here that the
benefits of a federation should come into play in two possible
ways: (a) enforce a strict set of laws prohibiting collusion,
in addition to strong punishments (e.g., being excluded from
the federation) if SCs are found to collude, and (b) designing
economic mechanisms (via the use of mechanism design
models) to incentivize SCs not to collude. However, the goal
of this work focuses on studying how the price of using shared
resources will affect the decisions of SCs that participate in
the federation, and not on modeling collusions. We leave the
latter for future work.
The same family of cost and utility function. in practice dif-
ferent SCs might have cost and utility functions coming from
different mathematical families. However, our design choice
(to assume functions from the same family) is motivated by
two practical insights stemming from our work:
• One major element in our work focuses on discussing
how the cost of resource usage affects the sharing strate-
gies under different environments. In this regard, we use
the simple type of linear cost functions as a representative
example of a cost function, which rationalizes realistic
system designs (see Sect II-B); in so doing, we reduce
the complexity of our analysis. However, without loss
of generality, other types of cost functions (even those
coming from different mathematical families) using the
same rationale as our work for the design of performance
parameters, will show the same trend (albeit different
values) when SCs change their sharing strategies: the
reason is that different functions will exhibit similar
mathematical properties of monotonicity, continuity, and
differentiability.
• A second important element in our work is the focus
on studying fairness in sharing resources among SCs
through the reduction of the cost (i.e,, C0i − CSii in
Eq. (1)). To this end, it is imperative that utility com-
parisons are done within a normalized interval range
(e.g., [0,1]) irrespective of SCs having different families
of utility functions in the worst case. This requires a
formal normalization step which is outside the scope
of our work. For simplicity, we assume that each SC
utility is already normalized over a given fixed range: we
implement this step in the experimental evaluation section
by fixing the γ value for each SC to be the same and
varying between 0 and 1. For SC cost and utility functions
from different mathematical families, after normalization,
would produce similar trends and practical insights from
fairness analysis, when compared to our experimental
study.
With respect to cost functions, we agree with the reviewer
that the cost of using shared VMs from SCs might be different
in the federation. However, our focus is on studying how
the cost of using shared resources affects the motivation of
participating in the cloud federation. If the cost of using
shared resources is not homogeneous, the decision will also
be affected by the resource allocation strategies (i.e., which
SC to request the resources from). We do not try to introduce
resource allocation strategies in this work, and thus assume
that prices are homogeneous. In future work, we plan to
study how the resource allocation strategies will affect the
sharing decisions made by individual SCs. We also plan to
incorporate different factors into our cost functions, such
as trustfulness among SCs, and to propose a mechanism to
evaluate multi-dimensional fairness for utility functions that
belong to different mathematical families.
Future Work. SC-Share evaluates resource sharing benefits
among SCs by accounting only for the cost of using VMs.
However, there are other parameters that SC-Share could
account for in evaluating resource sharing benefits: (i) pri-
vacy concerns/risks of sharing/forwarding resources within
cloud entities, (ii) data transmission costs for forwarding VM
requests among cloud entities, and (iii) power consumption
costs of running physical servers hosting VMs. We plan to
incorporate these parameters into the SC-Share framework as
part of future work.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed SC-Share for small-scale clouds
(SCs) to enable them to share their resources in a profitable
manner while maintaining customer SLAs. Our framework is
based on two (interacting) models: (i) an approximate perfor-
mance model with an efficient solution that is able to produce
sufficiently accurate estimates of performance characteristics
of interest; and (ii) a market-based model that results in
sharing policies which properly incentivize SCs to participate
in the federation while achieving market success. SC-Share
can suggest different price settings in different federations in
order to achieve sufficient market efficiency. Moreover, SC-
Share shows that even when the price of shared VMs is equal
to the price of using a public cloud, a federation can still be
formed under certain criteria.
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APPENDIX
A. Mathematical Assumptions in Existing Theorems
Here, we describe in detail why existing seminal micro-
economics theorems cannot be used to derive closed form
results for market equilibria in our work.
The seminal results by Nash provide a formal proof for both
finite (strategy spaces need not be continuous) and infinite
(strategy space is continuous) games that the existence of an
equilibrium is possible [45] only when (i) the strategy set is
compact, i.e., closed and bounded, convex, and non-empty,
and (ii) the utility functions are necessarily quasi-concave (or
stronger forms of concavity) in a player’s (mixed strategy)
action, and continuous in the vector of players actions. In
addition, the theorem of Nash is valid only for the guaranteed
existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. However, in
our work we are only interested in the guarantee of pure
strategy Nash equilibria (see reason below), as it is more
practical to implement and realize. Thus, we design our SC’s
utility function as a quasi-concave function. However, if SCs’
self-defined utility functions are non-quasi concave function, a
mathematical proof for existing Nash equilibria in non-quasi
concave utility functions is still a difficult open problem based
on Nash’s theorem.
In regard to guaranteeing a pure strategy Nash equilibria,
consider another seminal theorem by Debreu, Fan, and Glicks-
berg (derived independently) [30]–[32] that infinite games un-
der the assumptions of (i) quasi-concavity of utility functions,
(ii) the utility functions being continuous in the vector of play-
ers actions, and (iii) convex and compact strategy sets, promise
the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium. However,
for many practical settings including ours, the quasi-concavity
assumption might not always be satisfied (arbitrary SCs’ utility
function), which in turn might not guarantee a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium (violating theorem assumptions). Thus, a
mathematical proof for existing Nash equilibria in non-quasi
concave utility functions is still a difficult open problem based
on the theorem by Glicksberg et.al. In addition, strategy sets
in many applications (including specialized versions of our
application setting, i.e., the number of shared VMs is discrete
in nature) might not be continuous, in which case, we would
have to go back to using Nash’s theorem to guarantee mixed
strategy Nash equilibria.
An even stronger seminal theoretical result was proposed
by Dasgupta and Maskin [33] that states: games under the
assumptions of (i) quasi-concavity of utility functions, (ii) the
utility functions being discontinuous (if we are dealing with
arbitrary utility functions as SCs might demand) in the vector
of players actions, and (iii) convex and compact strategy sets,
promise the existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
However, in our work we are only interested in pure strategy
Nash equilibria (see reason below). Thus, a mathematical
proof for existing Nash equilibria in non-quasi concave utility
functions is still a difficult open problem based on the theorem
by Dasgupta and Maskin.
Thus, we observe that practical modeling of a system
might not always fit the theoretical assumptions required to
mathematically prove the existence of a pure strategy Nash
equilibria. Therefore, we resort to a simulation evaluation to
search for the existence of Nash equilibria. However, through
simulation results, we do observe the existence of pure strategy
Nash equilibria for infinite strategy spaces (simulated in a
discrete manner, thereby becoming a finite game in simula-
tion), and for non quasi-concave peer net utility functions.
Thus, at least from the experimental results, we observe that
for our work, (i) it is not necessary (via the theorem of
Nash) for quasi concavity to hold for a pure strategy (also
discounting the guarantee of only a mixed strategy via Nash’s
theorem) Nash equilibrium to exist, and (ii) it is not necessary
(via the theorem of Debreu et.al.) for quasi concavity to
hold for a pure strategy (also discounting the infinite strategy
space assumption via the theorem by Debreu. et.al, as the
simulation is discrete in nature) Nash equilibrium to exist.
Taking all the above-mentioned issues in our work related
to fitting the assumptions required to prove the existence of
Nash equilibrium in theory, and the information structure,
we adopt a typical approach of fictitious play, i.e., a time-
averaged technique [27] from the theory of learning in games,
which allows us to converge upon a Nash equilibria (provided
its existence). However, we cannot guarantee to reach the
equilibrium if the SCs’ self-defined utility functions are non-
quasi concave.
Finally, we report an historical perspective on the rationale
for studying pure strategy Nash equilibria:
During the 1980s, the concept of mixed strategies
came under heavy fire for being intuitively “prob-
lematic.” Randomization, central in mixed strategies,
lacks behavioral support. Seldom do people make
their choices following a lottery. This behavioral
problem is compounded by the cognitive difficulty
that people are unable to generate random out-
comes without the aid of a random or pseudo-
random generator. In 1991, game theorist Ariel Ru-
binstein described alternative ways of understanding
the concept. The first, due to Harsanyi (1973), is
called purification, and supposes that the mixed
strategies interpretation merely reflects our lack of
knowledge of the players’ information and decision-
making process. Apparently random choices are
then seen as consequences of non-specified, payoff-
irrelevant exogenous factors. However, it is unsat-
isfying to have results that hang on unspecified
factors. Later, Aumann and Brandenburger (1995)
[27] re-interpreted Nash equilibrium as an equilib-
rium in beliefs, rather than actions. For instance,
in the “rock-paper-scissors” game an equilibrium
in beliefs would have each player believing the
other was equally likely to play each strategy. This
interpretation weakens the predictive power of Nash
equilibrium, however, since it is possible in such
an equilibrium for each player to actually play a
pure strategy of Rock. Ever since, game theorists’
attitude towards mixed strategies-based results have
been ambivalent. Mixed strategies are still widely
used for their capacity to provide Nash equilibria in
games where no equilibrium in pure strategies exist,
but the model does not specify why and how players
randomize their decisions.
From: Strategy (game theory), Wikipedia
